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It has recently been proposed that in addition to verbatim and propositional text represen-
tations, a reader also forms a cognitive representation of the situations addressed by the 
text. This theoretical position was supported in three experiments which examined en-
coding processes, the cognitive products, and retrieval processes of the verbatim, proposi-
tional, and situational processing components: The degree of propositional and situational 
processing was successfully manipulated by varying the subjects1 study goals. As a conse-
quence of these differential encoding processes, subjects who studied for text summariza-
tion remembered more propositional information while subjects with a knowledge acquisi-
tion goal remembered more situational information. It was found that the situational en-
coding and retrieval processes proceeded faster than the respective propositional processes. 
In a sentence recognition task, subjects more strongly relied upon situational than proposi-
tional information, demonstrating the importance of situational representations in text com-
prehension. © 1986 Academic Press. Inc. 
While psychologists have investigated in 
some detail how subjects remember texts 
(Kintsch, 1974; Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978; 
Sachs, 1967; Schank & Abelson, 1977), in 
real life texts are often studied with a com-
pletely different intention. For example, a 
student studying a computer science text-
book or a car mechanic studying a repair 
manual is more interested in acquiring 
knowledge about the respective subject do-
main as opposed to merely remembering 
the wording or meaning of a particular text. 
In order to successfully interact with a 
computer, the student must develop some 
mental representation which provides de-
tailed information about the respective 
system. Such domain knowledge may also 
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be acquired without reading a text, for ex-
ample through exploring and learning by 
doing (Anzai & Simon, 1979). Thus, stu-
dents' cognitive representations of a partic-
ular text and their respective domain 
knowledge may obviously differ in content. 
Recently, van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) 
have provided several arguments that this 
distinction between text representations 
proper and the mental representations of 
the (real or hypothetical) situations ad-
dressed by a text may be very important for 
psychological theories of text comprehen-
sion. Just as philosophy and linguistics dis-
tinguish between meaning and reference, 
van Dijk and Kintschfs discourse theory 
differentiates between the cognitive repre-
sentations of a text and the representation 
of the situations which are addressed by 
the text. This latter representation which is 
a representation of a specific domain has 
been termed the mental or si tuation 
model.1 It is to be distinguished from ver-
batim and propositional text representa-
1 The term "situation model" has been used in this 
paper instead of "mental model'' because it better de-
scribes the content of information represented. 
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tions, which people have been found to 
construct when reading a text (Kintsch, 
1974; Mil ler & Kintsch, 1980; Ratcliff & 
M c K o o n , 1978). Unlike a situation model, 
which may even be constructed in the ab-
sence of a text, a propositional text repre-
sentation is inherently tied to the (reader's 
perceived) meaning structure of a text. A 
propositional textbase, which consists of a 
micro- and macrostructure, thus represents 
the meaning of a particular text and its gist. 
A verbatim text representation would be 
even more closely related to some given 
text. Since texts can be remembered by 
their wording (Keenan, MacWhinney, & 
Mayhew, 1977) as well as by their meaning 
(Kintsch, 1974), the psychological rele-
vance of the distinction between verbatim 
and propositional representations is rather 
well established. 
Although it has been shown that domain 
knowledge, which is supposedly encoded 
in a situation model, affects the construc-
tion of a text's meaning representation 
(Spilich, Vesonder, Chiesi, & Voss, 1979), 
it also needs to be investigated how (or 
whether) new domain knowledge can be 
acquired from studying a text. Van Dijk 
and Kintsch (1983) have suggested that 
readers encode such domain knowledge by 
building (or updating) a situation model 
when studying a text, in addition to con-
structing verbatim and propositional text 
representations. The formation of an ap-
propriate situation model may be of partic-
ular importance for utilizing the informa-
tion presented in the text in order to per-
form a novel task in the respective subject 
domain, such as verifying a computer pro-
gram after hav ing s tudied a manual 
(Schmalhofer, 1982). 
Since the textbase and the situation 
model may be constructed by presumably 
interacting, but nevertheless separate, 
mental processes, it is expected that sub-
jects who study a text in order to write a 
summary thereafter (text summarization 
(TS) subjects), would emphasize proposi-
tional text encoding by enhancing the 
macro- as well as the microprocessing of a 
text. These subjects should therefore show 
different reading time patterns than sub-
jects who study the same text in order to 
acquire knowledge about the respective 
subject domain (knowledge acquisition 
(KA) subjects). Whereas the reading times 
of subjects who read a text for text memory 
have been shown to be longer for text seg-
ments which are located high in the text hi-
erarchy (Cirilo & Foss, 1980), subjects who 
study a text for knowledge acquisition are 
expected to spend relatively more time pro-
cessing those subordinate paragraphs 
which present crucial information about 
the subject domain itself. 
As a consequence of these differential 
encoding processes, TS subjects are pre-
dicted to show better propositional text 
memory, even for micropropositions, than 
K A subjects. On the other hand, K A sub-
jects should develop a more accurate situa-
tional representation than TS subjects. 
However, if the formation of a situation 
model is an integral part of the text com-
prehension processes (Garnham, 1981), 
even TS subjects could develop stronger 
situational than propositional representa-
tions. 
The information retrieval from the two 
cognitive structures may also be quite dif-
ferent. While a textbase may be searched 
until some propositions match the proposi-
tions of the text sentence, the situational 
information may be retrieved faster. Sup-
porting evidence has been presented by 
Reder (1982) who argued that subjects 
more efficiently judge a test sentence by its 
plausibility, which is supposedly based 
upon s i t u a t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n , than 
searching memory for an exact proposi-
tional match. If, however, TS and K A sub-
jects did not differ by their development of 
a situation model, no structural differences 
in the encoding processes, cognitive struc-
tures, and retrieval processes would be ex-
pected between the two subject groups. 
In order to examine the construction of 
verbatim and propositional text representa-
tions on the one hand, and representations 
of the situations referred to by a text on the 
other, three experiments were performed. 
Rather than investigating the structure of 
some fully developed knowledge structure 
for expert programming, the present study 
investigates how verbatim, propositional, 
and situational representations are formed, 
when people without prior domain knowl-
edge study a programmer's manual for the 
first time. By instructing subjects to study 
the manual either for text summarization or 
for knowledge acquisition, the first experi-
ment investigated differences in the en-
coding processes of text and situational in-
formation, while the second experiment ex-
amined differences in the resul t ing 
cognitive structures. In order to test the 
different information retrieval speeds from 
verbatim, propositional, and situational 
representations, a speed accuracy trade-off 
analysis was performed in a third experi-
ment. The three experiments thus investi-
gate the encoding processes, the resulting 
cognitive structures, and the retrieval pro-
cesses of three components of text under-
standing. 
E X P E R I M E N T 1 
In order to investigate the construction 
of propositional and situational representa-
tions in a realistic but controlled setting, 
subjects who did not know anything about 
LISP were given part of a LISP program-
mer's manual to study. This text was well 
suited for investigating the initial construc-
tion of situational representations during 
text comprehension. The experimental text 
has a clearly identifiable hierarchical struc-
ture which is shown in Figure 1. Whereas 
the paragraphs at the highest level (Level 1) 
in the text hierarchy expressed the text's 
macrostructure, substantive LISP informa-
tion, which is needed for the construction 
of a situational representation, was pre-
sented at the lower levels of the text hier-
archy. Since the most important informa-
tion for constructing a textbase and a situa-
tion model were contained in different 
paragraphs, differences in the cognitive 
processing of TS and K A readers can be 
assessed by comparing the reading times of 
different text segments. TS readers suppos-
edly emphasize macroprocessing in their 
construction of a textbase, and should 
therefore spend more time reading the sen-
tences of the Level 1 paragraphs than the 
other paragraphs (Cirilo & Foss, 1980). K A 
readers, on the other hand, are assumed to 
emphasize the construction of a situation 
model and therefore should spend rela-
tively more time on the lower level para-
graphs than on the level 1 paragraphs. Con-
sequently, a hierarchical text level by sub-
ject group interaction is expected. N o 
prediction, however, can be made, as to 
which group wi l l show longer overall 
reading times: If the construction of a 
macrostructure is relatively more time con-
suming than the development of a situation 
model, the overall reading times of K A 
readers would be faster and vice versa. 
Method 
Subjects. Sixty-four University of Colo-
rado undergraduates, who did not have any 
knowledge about LISP, participated in the 
experiment in order to fulfill an introduc-
tory psychology course requirement. 
Material. A short programmer's manual 
(742 words) which introduced LISP data 
representations (atoms and S-expressions) 
was constructed based upon the first 
couple of pages of McCarthy, Abrahams, 
Edwards, Hart, and Levin's LISP 1.5 Pro-
grammer's Manual (1965). The hierarchical 
structure of the text thus obtained is shown 
in Figure 1. In this figure, each paragraph 
of the text is represented by a node at one 
of the four different levels in the text hier-
archy. The three paragraphs at the highest 
level (level 1) consisted of an introduction 
which motivated the reader to study the 
text, an outline of the material to be pre-
sented, and a summary of the presented 
material. These three paragraphs, which 
presented the text's macroinformation, oc-
curred as the first, second, and last para-
LEVEL LISP TEXT 
INTRODUCTION 
14.62) 
LISP ATOMS 
(1.11) 
COMPOSED S-EXPRESSIONS 
(4.67) 
DEFINITION 
(3.47) 
EXAMPLES 
OF CORRECTLY 
BUILT ATOMS 
(6.67) 
EXEMPLIFICATION 
(1.22) 
EXAMPLES 
OF INCORRECTLY 
BUILT ATOMS 
(6.72) 
DEFINITION 
(2.55) 
EXAMPLES OF 
CORRECTLY BUILT 
S-EXPRESSIONS 
(6.79) 
COMPOSITION OF 
S-EXPRESSIONS 
(4.73) 
EXAMPLES 
OF INCORRECTLY 
BUILT S-EXPRESSIONS 
(6.92) 
F I G . 1. Hierarchical structure of the paragraphs of the LISP programmer's manual. (The two 
numbers under the paragraph headlines refer to the number of sentences and the number of words 
contained in the paragraph, respectively.) 
graphs of the text, respectively. The subor-
dinate paragraphs at levels 2 and 3 intro-
duced and elaborat ively refined more 
substantive information about the program-
ming language L I S P which should be most 
useful for the construction of a situation 
model. The lowest level (level 4) in the text 
hierarchy presented specific examples of 
correctly and incorrectly formed LISP data 
together with brief explanations.2 
Procedure. The experiment, which was 
conducted on Visual 200 terminals con-
trolled by the V A X 11/780 computer of the 
Computer Laboratory for Instruction in 
Psychological Research at the University 
of Colorado, was subject paced. 
The subjects first read the instructions 
for the experiment on the terminal screen 
in order to familiarize themselves with the 
2 In the text, all five paragraphs on atoms occurred 
before the paragraphs on S-expressions. Within these 
two groups of five paragraphs, the paragraphs at the 
higher levels were presented before the paragraphs at 
the lower levels and the paragraph to the left, in 
Figure 1, was presented before the paragraph to the 
right within a level. 
mode of presentation of the experimental 
materials. A l l subjects were told to study 
the L I S P text in a way that would enable 
them to do very well on the test that would 
follow. The only difference in the instruc-
tions of the two subject groups concerned 
the study goal. Half of the subjects were 
told that the test would involve writing a 
brief summary of the L I S P text (text sum-
marization (TS) readers) and the other half 
were told that the test would involve a pro-
gramming task which would consist of 
writing and verifying L I S P expressions 
(knowledge acquisition ( K A ) readers). 
The L I S P text was presented one sen-
tence at a time. In order to indicate the 
start of a new paragraph, a heading which 
introduced the topic of the next paragraph 
was presented before each new para-
graph. The headings were presented in all 
capital letters so as to distinguish them 
from the text sentences. When subjects had 
finished studying a sentence, they pressed 
a button to request the next sentence. They 
had been informed that they could not re-
turn to previously presented sentences and 
that they should not take any breaks while 
studying the sentences. Sentence reading 
times were collected by the computer. 
Results and Discussion 
A sentence by reading inst ruct ion 
A N O V A revealed that the sentences were 
read significantly faster by K A subjects 
(325.8 s) than by TS subjects (406.8 s), 
F(l,62) = 11.1, M 5 e - 191.1, p < .005, 
and, as would be expected, that the 50 sen-
tences yielded different reading times, 
F(49,3038) = 64.3, MSQ = 16.3, p < .0001. 
Since a significant sentence by reading in-
struction interaction, F(49,3038) = 1.96, 
MSC - 16.3, p < .0001, was found, K A 
readers (who read 136.6 words per minute) 
could not have simply applied the same 
comprehension processes as TS readers 
(who read 109.4 words per minute) at a 
higher speed. Since the TS readers were 
slower, these results suggest that TS 
readers were more thoroughly engaged in 
some relatively time consuming processing 
component which affected the processing 
of the 50 sentences differently. K A readers, 
on the other hand, could have emphasized 
a different processing component, thus 
yielding a sentence by subject group inter-
action and overall reading time differences 
between TS subjects and K A subjects. 
In order to determine which processing 
components were emphasized by each of 
the two subject groups, average word 
reading times were calculated for each 
level of the text hierarchy. Thus, how the 
average reading times of the two subject 
groups depended upon the hierarchical 
level of the segments in the text could be 
analyzed. Since the sentences at the lowest 
text level (Level 4) contained long for-
mulas, Level 4 was excluded from the anal-
ysis. In addition to significant group differ-
ences, F(l,62) = 9.39, MSC = 0.073, p < 
.005, and differences between the text 
levels, F(2,124) = 11.32,M5 e = 0.010, p< 
.0001, a significant interaction was again 
found, F(2,124) = 3.67, MSe = 0.010, p < 
.05, indicating structural processing differ-
ences between the two subject groups. 
The average word reading times for each 
of the two subject groups and the different 
text levels are shown in Figure 2. TS 
readers showed a clear levels effect with 
the longest word reading times for the 
highest leve l in the text h ierarchy. 
Newman-Keuls tests showed that the TS 
readers' word reading times for the three 
text levels differed significantly from one 
another {p < .05). K A subjects, on the 
other hand, showed the longest word 
reading times for the second text level, 
which presented substantial information 
about the programming language LISP. The 
Newman-Keuls test yielded a significant 
difference (p < .05) only between levels 2 
and 3. Thus, unlike TS readers K A readers 
did not show a clear levels effect in their 
reading times. Although it was expected 
that K A readers would study the level 2 
and level 3 paragraphs approximately 
equally intensively, a significant difference 
was observed between the two levels. 
Since the level 2 paragraphs introduced 
some basic L I S P concepts for the first 
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FIG. 2. Average reading times per word (ms) as a 
function of the level in the text hierarchy for each of 
the two study instructions (studying in order to write a 
text summary or studying in order to acquire knowl-
edge about the subject domain). 
time, this result could possibly indicate that 
the generation of new knowledge elements 
in a situation model requires more time 
than further elaborating or updating al-
ready existing knowledge elements. 
These results suggest that by empha-
sizing macroprocessing TS readers were 
more thoroughly engaged in constructing a 
textbase, whereas K A readers focused on 
developing a situation model by processing 
the more substantive information about 
LISP. If the textbase and the situation 
model are indeed the cognitive products of 
two different processing components, the 
information processing differences demon-
strated in this experiment should also be 
reflected in the respect ive cogni t ive 
products. In order to test the prediction 
that K A readers emphasize the develop-
ment of a situation model whereas TS 
readers stress the construction of a text-
base, these cognitive products were exam-
ined in a second experiment. 
E X P E R I M E N T 2 
If the verbatim memory, the textbase, 
and the situation model are indeed the cog-
nitive products of verbatim, propositional, 
and situational processing components, 
subjects can also utilize the information of 
these three cognitive products in a sen-
tence recognition task. Although a recogni-
tion task asks the subjects to examine 
whether a sentence occurred in a text liter-
ally, in addition to verbatim memory, prop-
ositional and situational information may 
also be utilized for answering this question 
(Reder, 1982). In order to examine the rela-
tive strength of verbatim, propositional, 
and situational representations, a retrieval 
model must be specified for the three cog-
nitive structures. It is assumed that during 
the recognition processing of a sentence, 
the retrieval results of the three structures 
are continuously combined (e.g., added) to 
yield the currently accumulated recognition 
strength at any point in time. In addition, it 
is assumed that the accumulated recogni-
tion strength determines a subject's recog-
nition decision. By presenting subjects 
with test sentences which differ only by the 
contribution of one of the three cognitive 
structures, the strength of the respective 
structure may be examined. Four different 
types of test sentences can be constructed: 
A sentence may be presented in the form it 
occurred in the text (O-sentences); it may 
be paraphrased (P-sentences); its meaning 
may be changed while preserving its situa-
tional correctness (M-sentences); a i d its 
situational correctness could be changed in 
addition (C-sentences). As shown in Table 
1, the O - P , P - M , and M - C sentence pairs 
differ only by the contribution of the ver-
batim, the propositional, and the situa-
tional representations, respectively. 
Under the assumption that the accumu-
lated recognition strengths are normally 
distributed with equal variances, the 
strength of verbatim, propositional, and sit-
uational representations may be assessed 
in a signal detection analysis by d' (Egan, 
1975). The strength of the verbatim repre-
sentation may be measured as the differ-
ence between the response distributions of 
original and paraphrased sentences. A d! 
value for the verbatim component will be 
calculated by using the hit rate to O-sen-
tences and the false alarm rate to P-sen-
tences. Similarly, a d' value for proposi-
tional information may be calculated from 
the percentage of ' ' yes" responses to P-
sentences and the false alarm rate to M -
sentences. Finally, a d' value for situational 
information may be derived from the per-
centage of ' 'yes" responses to M - and C-
sentences. 
The strengths of the three cognitive 
structures were examined for text summa-
rization (TS) and knowledge acquisition 
(KA) readers. Possible trade-off effects of 
response time and response accuracy were 
eliminated by determining the asymptote of 
recognition performance for TS and K A 
readers with the use of a tapping speed ac-
curacy trade-off paradigm (Wickelgren, 
Corbett, & Dosher, 1980). 
T A B L E 1 
CONTRIBUTION OF V E R B A T I M , PROPOSITIONAL, AND SITUATIONAL REPRESENTATIONS TO E A C H OF THE FOUR 
SENTENCE FORMS 
Test sentence 
Source of Correctness Meaning 
information changed changed Paraphrased Original 
Verbatim _ - + 
Propositional - - + 
Situational - + + 
Note. The t k + " and k t - " indicate whether a cognitive structure supplies evidence for a "yes" (old) or "no" 
(new) recognition decision, respectively. 
Method 
Subjects. Sixty-four subjects were re-
cruited from the subject pool used in Ex-
periment 1. 
Material. The programmer's manual pre-
pared for Experiment 1 was also used as 
the text in this experiment. 
Ten affirmative and ten negative sen-
tences on examples of L I S P data, which 
occurred in the level 4 paragraphs of the 
text, were used to construct the recognition 
test. Affirmative sentences consisted of 
two clauses which stated that a given LISP 
data example is a correctly built type of 
LISP data (clause 1), with a specific ele-
ment (clause 2). Negative sentences stated 
that a given LISP data example is incor-
rectly formed (clause 1), because of a spe-
cific element (clause 2). For each of these 
original (0-) sentences, three distractors 
were const ructed: Paraphrased (P-), 
meaning-changed (M-), and correctness-
changed (C-) sentences (see Table 2). 
Distractor sentences were created by ex-
changing words or clauses among the 20 
original sentences, so that the distractor 
sentences consisted only of words and 
phrases which had occurred in the text. P-
sentences were constructed by replacing 
words of the second clause with synonyms. 
M-sentences were obtained by exchanging 
the second clauses of O-sentences in such a 
way that the constructed sentences were 
still correct with respect to the rules of 
LISP. For C-sentences, changes of the 
LISP example which are difficult to recog-
nize, such as deleting or inserting a dot 
(Schmalhofer, 1982), were applied in addi-
tion to exchanging the second clauses; thus 
the resulting sentences were incorrect with 
respect to the rules of LISP In addition, 
this construction ensured that the L I S P 
data example was consistent with the infor-
mation presented by the second clause. 
The 80 sentences thus obtained were di-
vided into four different versions of the 
test, with every set containing exactly 5 
T A B L E 2 
A N E X A M P L E OF AN ORIGINAL AFFIRMATIVE AND AN ORIGINAL NEGATIVE SENTENCE AND THEIR RESPECTIVE DISTRACTORS 
Test sentence Affirmative Negative 
Original 
Paraphrased 
Meaning-changed 
Correctness-
changed 
PSY100 is a legal atom, 
that concludes with a number. 
PSY100 is a legal atom, 
which ends with a numeral. 
PSY100 is a legal atom. 
which begins with a letter. 
PSY.100 is a legal atom, 
that contains a dot. 
BIO.-200 is not a legal atom. 
because it contains a dot. 
BIO.-200 is not a legal atom. 
since it has a period. 
BIO.-200 is not a legal atom. 
since it has a dash. 
BIO200 is not a legal atom. 
because it concludes with a number. 
sentences of each form so that each of the 
20 original sentences was represented in 
each version by one of the four different 
forms (0-, P-, M - , and C-sentences). 
Procedure. The entire experiment was 
controlled by the Vax 11/780 computer. 
Subjects were told that the experimental 
session consisted of two independent ex-
periments: A general knowledge test and 
an experiment on text comprehension. In 
reality, the general knowledge test served 
as a practice of the speed accuracy trade 
off procedure which would later be used in 
the recognition test. 
B o t h subject g roups , T S and K A 
readers, read the instructions and studied 
the LISP text, exactly as in Experiment 1. 
Then they reviewed the text, paragraph by 
paragraph, until they had studied the text 
for a total of 9 min. Thus, differences in 
overall study times between TS and K A 
readers were eliminated as a confounding 
factor in the recognition test. Although the 
overall study time was held constant at 9 
min, the individual paragraph reading 
times, which were controlled by the sub-
jects themselves, could vary. 
Recognition test instructions and the rec-
ognition test directly followed. In the rec-
ognition test, subjects had to determine 
whether a test sentence had occurred ver-
batim in the text. In order to provide a 
warm-up and to increase the proportion of 
old sentences, the test began with four filler 
sentences. The actual test consisted of one 
of the four test versions. Each test version 
was presented to eight TS and eight K A 
readers. The order of presentation of the 
sentences in a test version was newly ran-
domized for each subject. 
The procedure for the recognition test 
was modeled after the tapping speed accu-
racy trade-off method of Wickelgren et al. 
(1980). With this method, seven old-new 
responses were collected for each sen-
tence. The subjects ' responses were 
probed by response signals (tones) which 
occurred 2 s apart from each other. For 
every response signal, a subject had to ei-
ther press the "yes" or the "no" button. 
Contrary to the method of Wickelgren et 
al., no confidence ratings were collected; 
that is, for every response signal a subject 
had to press only one button. Since the 
subjects gave their first response in the 
form of a guess, which caused a test sen-
tence to appear on the screen 1 s later, sub-
jects' recognition responses were collected 
1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 s after the presentation 
of the test sentence. 
Results 
Since a performance asymptote was 
reached approximately 5 s after the presen-
tation of a test sentence, relative fre-
quencies of "yes" responses were calcu-
lated by pooling the responses which had 
occurred at least 5 s after the sentence pre-
sentation. For TS readers, the relative fre-
quencies of "yes " responses were 0.726 
for O-sentences, 0.732 for P-sentences, 
0.489 for M-sentences, and 0.165 for C-sen-
tences. For K A readers, the respective fre-
quencies were 0.760 for O-sentences, 0.636 
for P-sentences, 0.564 for M-sentences, 
and 0.161 for C-sentences. 
For every subject, d' scores for the three 
cognitive representations were calculated. 
The mean d' scores of verbatim, proposi-
tional, and situational representations thus 
obtained for TS and K A readers are shown 
in Table 3. A 2 x 3 reading goal by cogni-
tive representation A N O V A revealed dif-
ferences in the strength of the three cogni-
tive representations, F(2,124) = 13.64, 
MSG = 1.58, p < .0001, as well as a signifi-
cant interaction between reading goal and 
cognitive representation, F(2,124) = 3.23, 
MSe = 1.58, p < .05. The two reading 
goals did not produce overall performance 
differences, however, F < 1. Newman-
Keuls tests showed that the interaction ef-
fect was due to the two reading goals pro-
ducing significant effects in different direc-
tions for the three memory representations. 
Newman-Keuls tests furthermore revealed 
that for TS readers, the strength of the ver-
batim representation differed significantly 
T A B L E 3 
d' A C C U R A C Y SCORES OF E A C H PROCESSING G O A L FOR THE T H R E E COGNITIVE STRUCTURES 
Representation 
Processing goal Verbatim Propositional Situational 
Text summarization -0.10 0.84 1.15 
Knowledge acquisition 0.38 0.25 1.42 
from the propositional and the situational 
representation, which were not signifi-
cantly different. For K A readers, only the 
situational representation was significantly 
different from the verbatim and proposi-
tional representations, which were about 
equal. 
Discussion 
Since the two subject groups performed 
about equally well overall in the sentence 
recognition task, the differences in their 
performances cannot be explained by one 
reading goal simply causing a semantically 
deeper level of text processing (Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972) than the other reading 
goal. Instead, the significant interaction be-
tween reading goal and cognitive represen-
tation shows that TS and K A readers em-
phasized different components of text pro-
cessing. Whereas TS readers developed a 
better propositional text representation, 
K A readers emphasized the construction of 
a situation model. By demonstrating how 
the development of cognitive structures de-
pends upon a reader's processing goals, 
these results provide additional evidence 
for the distinction between a propositional 
text representation and a situation model. 
Contrary to the experimental predic-
tions, however, K A readers showed better 
verbatim memory than TS readers. A l -
though this result is surprising, it could 
be explained by K A readers having studied 
the example sentences more extensively. 
Since, the sentences employed in the rec-
ognition task provided examples of LISP 
data, they were more relevant for the con-
struction of a situation model than for the 
formation of the text's macrostructure. By 
the end of the study phase, TS and K A 
readers may therefore have differed with 
respect to the verbatim information held in 
working memory that was relevant for the 
recognition test. The fact that the test 
phase followed immediately after the study 
phase in this experiment may thus have 
caused K A readers to correctly reject 
about 10% more paraphrased sentences 
than TS readers. 
E X P E R I M E N T 3 
In order to eliminate the influence of 
short-term memory and to further examine 
the speed with which information is re-
trieved from the three cognitive structures, 
an experiment with an interfering task be-
tween the study and the test phase was 
performed. Since in a recognition task a 
textbase must be searched for a proposi-
tional match between the test sentence and 
textbase, the information retrieval from a 
textbase has been predicted to be relatively 
time consuming (Reder, 1982). In compar-
ison, situational information, which may be 
used to judge a sentence by its plausibility 
with respect to the situations described by 
a text, may be accessed more directly 
without elaborate searching. For example, 
in a recognition task the information of a 
situation model may be utilized by trans-
lating the test sentence into its situational 
representation and comparing it with the 
situation model. With a consistency check 
(Johnson-Laird, 1980, 1983) a person may 
thus judge whether the test sentence oc-
curred or could have occurred in the text. 
Because of these possible differences in the 
cognitive representations of the textbase 
and the situation model, it is predicted that 
the information of a situation model is re-
trieved faster as well as more accurately. 
This prediction will be tested by examining 
the speed accuracy trade-off relation of 
verbatim, propositional, and situational re-
trieval components in the recognition of 
sentences. 
Method 
Sixty-four subjects from the same sub-
ject pool, the same materials, and the same 
procedure as in Experiment 2 were used. 
The only difference was that in the present 
experiment subjects were given an interpo-
lated task between the study and test phase 
of the text. The interpolated task, which 
took about 15 min, consisted of a study and 
test phase with an unrelated text. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 4 shows the percentage of "yes" 
responses for the two subject groups and 
the four sentence types. The average d'-re-
trieval scores of verbatim, propositional, 
and situational information 3 which were 
obtained for the different processing times 
are shown in Figure 3. For each of the 
three information retrieval components, 
separate subject group by processing time 
(2 x 7) A N O V A s were performed upon the 
respective d' values. In these analyses, the 
first level of processing time, which con-
sisted of the subjects' guesses before they 
even saw the specific test sentence, may be 
used as a baseline for evaluating the re-
trieval strengths at 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 s 
after the presentation of the test sentence. 
Comparison of subject groups. For ver-
batim memory, neither reliable main effects 
nor a significant interaction effect was ob-
tained, demonstrating that, after the inter-
fering task, verbatim memory was very 
weak or had vanished. Subjects, however, 
showed reliable memory for propositional 
information, F(6,372) = 8.59, MSQ = 0.67, 
3 Rather than incremental d scores (see Wickelgren 
et al., 1980), the more widely used d' measures were 
employed throughout this research. 
p < .0001. Since neither subject group nor 
interaction effects were significant, TS and 
K A readers showed about the same re-
trieval performance of propositional infor-
mation. Situational information was also 
reliably remembered, F(6,372) - 29.3, MSQ 
= 0.86, p < .0001. Although no significant 
group differences were found, a significant 
interaction, F(6,372) = 2.36, MSe = 0.86, 
p < .05, demonstrated differences in the re-
trieval of situational information between 
TS and K A readers. As seen in Figure 3, 
these differences are mostly due to K A 
readers showing a higher final level of ac-
curacy than TS readers. In summary, the 
three analyses demonstrated that instead of 
verbatim information, subjects based their 
recognition decisions mostly upon proposi-
tional and situational information, and that 
K A readers retrieved more situational in-
formation than TS readers. 
Comparison of the propositional and the 
situational retrieval components. In order 
to compare the relative strengths and the 
time characteristics of propositional and 
situational information retrieval, ^'-dif-
ference scores between propositional and 
situational d' values were calculaed for 
the retrieval results at 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, and 11 s 
after the presentation of the test sentence. 
Whereas K A readers retrieved more situa-
tional information, F(5,155) = 2.51, MSt = 
2.01, p < .05, a one-way A N O V A did not 
show a significant processing time effect 
for TS readers. However, for both subject 
groups, the relation between the accuracy 
and the retrieval speed was different for 
propositional and situational information. 
K A readers had retrieved significantly 
more situational than propositional infor-
mation after 5 (t = 2.18, p < .05), 7 (t = 
2.81,/? < .01), 9 (f = 2.59, p < .05), and 11 
(t = 2.65, p < .05) s. Even TS readers had 
retrieved significantly more situational than 
propositional information at 5 s (t = 2.31, p 
< .05). Since for TS and K A readers, the 
maximum difference score occurred at 5 
and at 7 s, respectively, rather than at 11 s, 
it may be concluded that both subject 
T A B L E 4 
RELATIVE FREQUENCIES OF "Yes" RESPONSES AT DIFFERENT PROCESSING TIMES FOR THE FOUR TYPES OF T E S T SENTENCES 
UNDER Two READING G O A L S 
T S readers K A readers 
Pr(yes) 0 P M C O P M C 
After 1 s 0.711 0.637 0.664 0.589 0.781 0.744 0.713 0.658 
After 3 s 0.722 0.706 0.638 0.333 0.805 0.745 0.681 0.419 
After 5 s 0.738 0.675 0.550 0.181 0.794 0.709 0.603 0.219 
After 7 s 0.776 0.695 0.484 0.164 0.802 0.723 0.586 0.138 
After 9 s 0.800 0.665 0.467 0.146 0.813 0.716 0.558 0.125 
After 11 s 0.800 0.651 0.430 0.150 0.813 0.730 0.552 0.106 
Note. O, P, M , and C refer to original, paraphrased, meaning-changed, and correctness-changed sentences, 
respectively. 
groups retrieved situational information 
faster than propositional information. As 
Figure 3 shows, the retrieved propositional 
information increased rather slowly but 
constantly with processing time. Situa-
tional information, on the other hand, was 
accessed much faster, and soon reached a 
performance asymptote. 
In order to reveal the differences in the 
speed and accuracy of propositional and 
situational information retrieval, the d' 
scores observed at different processing 
times, r, were approximated by a func-
tion with speed and accuracy parameters 
(K (3, 8): 
d{t) = M l ~ exp{-(3[> 
0, 
8]}), for t > 8 
for / =s= 8. 
In this function, d(f) represents the d' ac-
curacy at processing time t, and 8 specifies 
the minimum processing time required for 
achieving a d' accuracy different from 
zero. X specifies the performance asymp-
tote and p is the exponential rate param-
eter, determining the speed with which this 
asymptote will be approached. This expo-
nential approach to a limit, \ , has success-
fully been used for describing memory re-
trieval processes (Dosher, 1982; Wickel-
gren et al., 1980). 
The parameters of the verbatim, the 
propositional, and the situational retrieval 
components were es t imated by the 
STEPIT minimization program (Chandler, 
1965). A least-squares criterion was applied 
to determine the retrieval functions which 
best described the observed d' values. The 
number of free parameters was reduced by 
assuming that the 8-parameter for each of 
the three retrieval components was the 
same for both subject groups. Figure 3 
shows the retrieval functions thus obtained 
for verbatim, propositional, and situational 
information. For the propositional and 
situational retrieval components, the pa-
rameters of these functions are presented 
in Table 5. 
Although the interpretation of the p-, 
and 8-parameters of the present model is 
often problematic because the parameter 
estimates may show artifactual interactions 
(Wickelgren et al., 1980), the parameter es-
timates shown in Table 5 are consistent 
with the statistical results reported above: 
A comparison of the 8-parameters indicates 
that situational information is more readily 
accessible than propositional information. 
Also, the p-parameters are consistent with 
the hypothesis that situational information 
is retrieved at a faster rate than proposi-
tional information. For reasons of com-
pleteness, the parameters obtained for ver-
batim memory which may be artifactual are 
also reported. For example, the perfor-
mance asymptote of verbatim memory of 
TS readers, \ = 0.94, may be inflated by a 
low retrieval rate, |3 = 0.0001, and a large 
8-parameter, 8 = 2136 ms. For K A 
r 
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F I G . 3. Accuracy scores {d') at different processing times for each of the three retrieval components 
(verbatim memory, textbase, and situation model) and the two study instructions (studying in order to 
write a text summary (TS) or studying in order to acquire knowledge, (KA)). The smooth curves 
represent best fitting speed accuracy trade-off functions. 
readers, the respective values were p = 
0.0018, X = 0.28. Since for verbatim 
memory no significant effect of processing 
time was obtained by the A N O V A , these 
parameters should not be interpreted. 
In order to evaluate the goodness of fit of 
the six curves to the 36 data points, the per-
centage of variance accounted for was de-
termined by a measure which adjusts for 
the number of parameters estimated from 
T A B L E 5 
T H E V A L U E S OF T H E SPEED AND A C C U R A C Y PARAMETERS OF THE FUNCTION d(/) AS ESTIMATED BY THE STEPIT 
MINIMIZATION PROGRAM FOR T H E PROPOSITIONAL AND SITUATIONAL RETRIEVAL COMPONENTS FOR E A C H SUBJECT GROUP 
Retrieval Subject Intercept Retrieval rate Performance 
component group (ms) (</7ms) asymptote U/') 
Propositional TS 1847 0.00027 0.81 
K A 0.00029 0.63 
Situational TS 684 0.00095 1.20 
K A 0.00034 1.74 
the data (Reed, 1973). This measure is de-
scribed by 
N 
2 it,- - *f)2/(N - K) 
r* = 1 - ^ , 
2 (Xi - xy/(N - i) 
/= i 
where N is the number of data points A*,, i , 
are the respective predicted values, X is the 
grand mean of xh and K is the number of 
parameters estimated from the data. With 
an r2 = .94, the fit between the model and 
the data can be considered quite good. 
When the results of Experiments 2 and 3 
are jointly analyzed by a 2 x 2 x 3 x 7 
A N O V A with the factors delay between 
study and test phase, reading goal, memory 
representation, and processing time, signif-
icant differences were found among the 
three memory representations, F(2,248) = 
20.39, MSe = 6.96, p < .0001, the different 
processing times, F(6,744) = 173.75, MSe 
= 0.22, p < .0001, the interaction between 
processing time and memory representa-
tion, F(12,1488) - 9.20, MSe = 0.98, p < 
.0001, as well as a marginally significant 
memory representation by reading goal in-
teraction, F(2,248) = 2.53, M 5 C , - 6.96,/; 
< .1. With the exception that the represen-
tation by reading goal interaction was only 
marginally significant, this analysis thus 
replicated the results of the individual anal-
yses of Experiments 2 and 3. 
It appears that the interpolated task suc-
ceeded in clearing short-term memory: 
While the second experiment only con-
firmed the predictions about propositional 
and situational representations, the pre-
dicted pattern of results was fully obtained 
in Experiment 3. Thus, the verbatim 
memory scores of Experiment 2 may in-
deed have been influenced by different in-
formation being held in working memory at 
the end of the study phase. 
G E N E R A L DISCUSSION 
When readers study a text such as a pro-
grammer's manual, three processing com-
ponents can be distinguished. A reader 
may process the wording and the meaning 
of a text as well as the situations addressed 
by it. For each of the three components, 
the influence of a reader's processing goal 
upon the encoding processes, the cognitive 
products, and the retrieval processes were 
examined. 
Experiment 1 showed that the goal of 
text summarization (TS) resulted in sub-
jects spending most time processing the 
text's macroinformation. Under knowledge 
acquisition ( K A ) instructions, however, 
subjects most intensively processed sub-
stantive situational information. Whereas 
Guindon and Kintsch (1984) have shown 
that subjects perform macroprocesses inde-
pendent of text summarization instruc-
tions, the present results clearly indicate 
that the intensity of macroprocessing de-
pended upon the two processing goals, 
which were induced by different reading 
instructions. 
Unlike TS readers, K A readers did not 
show the longest word reading times for the 
paragraphs at the highest text level ("levels 
effect;" Cirilo & Foss, 1980). The levels ef-
feet of reading times could thus be a result 
of the construction of a text's meaning rep-
resenta t ion and its macros t ruc tu re . 
Whereas TS readers may have constructed 
the text's macrostructure by applying heu-
ristic comprehension strategies such as 
micro- and macroprocesses, K A readers, 
besides constructing the text's microstruc-
ture, have emphasized the processing of 
situational information. Since TS readers 
studied the text much longer than K A 
readers, heuristic comprehension pro-
cesses appear to be more time consuming 
than the processing of the situations ad-
dressed by the text. The encoding time dif-
ferences between propositional and situa-
tional information could be explained by 
differences in the mode of processing: 
Whereas the heuristic comprehension pro-
cesses which construct a propositional 
textbase (Kintsch & van Dijk, 1978) are 
more likely to proceed mostly bottom-up, 
knowledge acquisition more directly de-
pends upon a reader's prior domain knowl-
edge (Schmalhofer, 1982), and may thus be 
faster because of the reader's expectations 
about the situations to be introduced next 
in the text. 
Experiments 2 and 3 showed that TS and 
K A subjects also differed by the cognitive 
products constructed during reading. 
Whereas TS subjects better remembered 
propositional information than did K A sub-
jects, K A subjects retrieved more situa-
tional information. In the third experiment 
it was found that accessing situational in-
formation is faster and proceeds at a higher 
speed than accessing text information. 
Even for recognition decisions, situational 
information is more important than ver-
batim or propositional text information. In 
addition to verbatim and propositional text 
representations, the cognitive representa-
tion of situational information is thus an 
important component when acquiring do-
main knowledge from studying a text. A l -
though text summarization and knowledge 
acquisition goals influenced the three pro-
cessing components in the predicted 
fashion, the differences among verbatim, 
propositional, and situational representa-
tions were relatively stable for TS and K A 
goals. 
For a technical text such as a program-
mer's manual, the present study thus pro-
vides an intriguing pattern of experimental 
results for the encoding, memory storage 
and retrieval of text and situational infor-
mation which need to be explained by cur-
rent theories of discourse comprehension. 
There are basically two ways to account for 
the differences in the encoding and re-
trieval speeds and memorability between 
text and situational information. 
One may argue that the difference be-
tween text and situational information, 
which were distinguished from one another 
by their contents, is just that and does not 
have any further implication with respect 
to their representation in memory. Thus 
only a single (propositional) memory repre-
sentation would be postulated. Under this 
assumption, the reading time differences of 
Experiment 1 could be accounted for in 
terms of the early Kintsch and van Dijk 
(1978) model by asserting that the reader's 
goal, and therefore the schema that for-
mally represents these goals, determines 
different propositions as relevant for TS 
and K A readers. Text summarization 
readers would consequently emphasize the 
propositional processing of general state-
ments about LISP, while K A readers would 
emphasize the processing of the more spe-
cific details about LISP. In order to explain 
the results of Experiments 2 and 3 and in 
particular how situational information in-
fluences subjects' recognition responses, it 
could be postulated that inferential pro-
cesses would derive the respective infor-
mation from a textbase at the time of the 
test. Such a model, which postulates that 
two different retrieval strategies operate 
upon verbatim and propositional memory 
traces, has been presented by Reder (1982). 
Supposedly, a direct retrievel strategy 
searches for an exact match between the 
wording or propositions of a test sentence 
and verbatim or propositional memory 
traces. On the other hand, plausibility 
judgments would calculate the plausibility 
of the test sentences which had not been 
inferred during reading from the proposi-
tional representation at the time of the test. 
In addition, Reder postulates that the more 
consistent a test sentence is with the text, 
the more likely it is that plausibility judg-
ments would produce a "yes" response in 
a recognition test: Therefore, more "yes 1 1 
responses are to be expected for M-sen-
tences than for C-sentences. However, 
some question remains as to whether such 
a model could really account for all aspects 
of the reported data in a straightforward 
way: If K A readers formed a propositional 
text representation which contained more 
propositions about LISP details, why did 
these readers then show worse proposi-
tional memory for these LISP details (Ex-
periment 2)1 Since all test sentences ad-
dressed specific details about LISP, K A 
readers should have shown better proposi-
tional memory than TS readers, who sup-
posedly encoded the more general informa-
tion about LISP. 
The theoretical framework set forward 
by van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) allows for 
an explanation which assumes that a text 
and the situations which are addressed by 
it have their own distinct existence in 
memory: Whereas the micro- and macro-
structure of a propositional textbase repre-
sents the meaning of a text and its gist, a 
situation model presumably represents the 
(real or fictional) situations addressed by 
the text. Within this framework the differ-
ences in memorabil i ty and processing 
speeds of text and situational information 
could be explained in terms of organiza-
tional differences between the textbase and 
situation model . Such an explanation 
would also take into consideration the re-
peated criticisms of Johnson-Laird and 
others that propositions by themselves 
cannot give a complete account of all the 
relevant aspects of meaning representa-
tions in memory. By distinguishing be-
tween a propositional textbase and a situa-
tion model, the meaning representation of a 
text can be differentiated from the cogni-
tive representation of the (real or fictional) 
state of affairs referred to by a text. 
In any case, the three experiments, 
which were performed in order to test some 
important assumptions of the discourse 
comprehension strategies described by van 
Dijk and Kintsch (1983), found that the 
predictions derived from this theory are at 
least valid for the particular programmer's 
manual under study. In order to generalize 
the results obtained by the method of single 
cases (Clark, 1973) and to further distin-
guish between alternative explanations of 
the reported results, research with different 
types of texts and different subject popula-
tions is needed. 
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